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THE PROBLEM OF NON-IDENTITY IN VALUING
NEWBORN HUMAN LIFE
Sadath A. Sayeed*
"[I]t is impossible for the courts to calculate the relative benefits
of an impaired life versus no life at all."'
"[T]here is a presumption that continued life is in the best
interests of a patient.",
2
INTRODUCTION
There is no quick and easy fix that resolves the tension between a
moral intuition that we ought to do as much as we can to safeguard
and preserve newly born human life and an intuition that some babies
facing daunting odds to survive long or survive well, even with
medical intervention, ought to be allowed to die. In challenging
clinical cases, where conscientious people might disagree about how
to proceed, prioritizing one set of values almost always necessitates
the sacrificing of other important values. American legal opinion in
statutory, regulatory, or common law form directly on point is
limited . Much of what is available only seems to aggravate existing
ethical strain.
4
Despite vociferous published criticism of the federal Baby Doe
regulations, 5 and the more recent Texas and Wisconsin state court
* Instructor, Division of Medical Ethics, Department of Global Health and Social Medicine,
Harvard Medical School, and Assistant in Medicine, Division of Newborn Medicine, Department of
Medicine, Children's Hospital Boston. This essay is based on my collective experience as a practicing
neonatologist, as a clinical ethicist, and as a reader of law. I am indebted to many people for their
thoughtful engagement with me on this subject. This manuscript has benefited from the specific
comments of Dan Brock, Bob Truog, Sam Kerstein, Glenn Cohen, and an anonymous reviewer-all of
whom were kind enough to read earlier versions.
1. Miller v. HCA, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Tex. 2003).
2. Montalvo v. Borkovec, 647 N.W.2d 413,421 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
3. See, e.g., Burks v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 588 N.W.2d 927 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
4. See generally Sadath A. Sayeed, The Marginally Viable Newborn: Legal Challenges, Conceptual
Inadequacies, and Reasonableness, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 600,600-10 (2006).
5. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15 (2008).
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opinions quoted at the outset, it is a mistake to simply dismiss the
arguments contained within such legal pronouncements. 6 The logic
within this line of controversial opinion extends back to the work of
legal scholar John Robertson, who in 1974, argued: "One who has
never known the pleasure of mental operation, ambulation, and social
interaction surely does not suffer from their loss as much as one who
has. . . . Life and life alone, whatever its limitations, might be of
sufficient worth.",7  A skeptical and conservative tradition of
questioning the permissibility of allowing quality-of-life judgments
to enter into a surrogate's decision-making calculus challenges a
parallel normative impulse within clinical neonatal practice to
recommend against offering medical therapy when it is believed to
offer minimal or limited benefits and risks serious burdens to the
newly born.
8
In this paper, I take a closer look at the analysis of neonatal
treatment dilemmas offered by the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, which was first published in 1983. 9 1 employ its
framework for ethical decision-making to defend the following
conclusion: exceedingly few newborns who stand a chance at
extended life should be denied a trial of medical treatment. My
interpretation is meant to be provocative. In order to show this, I
extend the analysis to a case in which a newborn's viability is highly
doubtful. I argue that whether one speaks in terms of benefits or
6. See generally Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best Interests Standard for Incompetent or
Incapacitated Persons of All Ages, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 187 (2007); John J. Paris et al., The
"Emergent Circumstances" Exception to the Need for Consent: The Texas Supreme Court Ruling in
Miller v. HCA, 24 J. PERINATOLOGY 337 (2004).
7. John A. Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 213, 254 (1975). I note only in passing here that there may be a problem with assigning an
ability to judge life's worth to one who has "never known the pleasure of mental operation." Id.
8. See generally Laurence B. McCullough, Neonatal Ethics at the Limits of Viability, 116
PEDIATRICS 1019 (2005); Sadath A. Sayeed, Baby Doe Redux? The Department of Health and Human
Services and the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002: A Cautionary Note on Normative Neonatal
Practice, 116 PEDIATRICS e576 (2005).
9. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS (1983)
[hereinafter Commission].
[VoL 25:4
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VALUING NEWBORN HUMAN LIFE
interests, a plausible case can be made for initiating potentially life-
saving therapy in such cases. This claim challenges a widely accepted
professional norm of either not offering or strongly recommending
against resuscitative therapy in cases of doubtful viability. I then
conclude with a decidedly less analytical reflection on neonatal
treatment dilemmas. I suggest that it is a mistake to insist that we
must always prioritize a newborn's survival interests and, further,
that it is implausible to think that, as a rule, the interests of others
cannot or should not influence clinical decisions to treat or not treat
individual patients. However, I do not attempt to philosophically
reconcile the conflict between consequentialist and deontological
positions on this issue. Instead, I argue more empirical work needs to
be carried out to help clarify why our intuitions might be mixed about
the moral value of newborn life.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING
In 1983, the President's Commission published a comprehensive
analysis to inform ethical decision-making involving "seriously ill
newborns."' 10 The framework that was developed followed careful
study and deliberation by authorities in the fields of medicine, law,
philosophy, theology, and other relevant disciplines. By virtue of its
diverse authorship and political sponsorship, the analysis arguably
represented a compromised opinion with the goal of generating
consensus policy. The Commission's articulation of the Best Interests
Standard and its framework for decision-making as it applies to
newborns is not amenable to mathematical proof; it is only one
possible understanding.'1
10. Id.
11. See discussion infra Part In. For the purposes of this argument, I make important initial
assumptions both about the conceptual plausibility of the Commission's analysis and its normative
influence in subsequent discourse about clinical decision-making. The philosopher Loretta Kopelman
has recently championed an understanding of the Best Interests Standard that seems notably different
than the one offered by the President's Commission. Among other things, she claims that "[t]he meaning
of the Best Interests Standard in making practical decisions... does not require ignoring all other duties,
allocation plans for scarce resources, or others' interests in deciding what ought to be done for
someone." Kopelman, supra note 6, at 188. The Commission, on the other hand, argues that "[the
20091
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To begin with, the Commission noted newborns' "subjective
wishes, real or hypothetical, are impossible to discern with any
certainty" and so it borrowed from legal tradition an alternative
decision-making mechanism: an objective measurement of
interests.12 Because never-competent persons' preferences cannot be
known, protecting welfare rather than honoring subjective desire
becomes the core moral consideration for surrogates. With that aim, a
series of semi-factual determinations, such as degree of pain and
suffering, quantity of life, and opportunity for future self-
determination, merit close attention by anyone performing the
interests assessment. The Commission did not define all of the
potentially relevant factors that could enter into a specific evaluation
or how much weight particular factors should receive, but a
proportional balancing of perceived benefits and burdens accruing to
the incompetent constitutes the essential analysis.
The Commission insisted that the standard be "very restrictive,"
requiring disabling conditions to be so severe that "continued
existence would not be a net benefit to the infant." 13 Given the
decisive agency of the surrogate decision maker in this assessment,
the Commission cautioned that proxies are "obligated to try and
evaluate benefits and burdens from the infant's own perspective."' 14
Of course, newborns have no informed perspective to speak of, but
discrete experiences of pain, comfort, satiety, warmth and the like are
processed in the early developing human brain. These immediate
standard] excludes consideration of ... effects of an impaired child's life on other persons, including
parents, siblings, and society." Commission, supra note 9, at 219. Kopelman seeks a standard that offers
pragmatic utility; she argues against an interpretation that is "self-defeating, unrealistic, or narrowly
focused on the needs of a single individual." Kopelman, supra note 6, at 194. The President's
Commission, on the other hand, seemed unapologetic in accepting the challenge of a strictly
individualistic construction of the standard: "although abiding by this standard may be difficult in
specific cases, it is all too easy to undervalue the lives of handicapped infants." Commission, supra note
9, at 219. The Commission's work predates Kopelman's recent discussion by more than two decades,
and this temporal fact calls into question her assertion that recent confusion about the standard's
meaning stems from inattention to why it was developed. Kopelman, supra note 6, at 188. Her claim
that the standard's "meaning is clear from its usage" also seems strangely ignorant of a legal
interpretation such as that contained in the Montalvo opinion. Kopelman, supra note 6, at 194.
12. Commission, supra note 9, at 134.
13. Commission, supra note 9, at 218.
14. Commission, supra note 9, at 219.
[Vol. 25:4
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VALUING NEWBORN HUMAN LIFE
factors might initially seem most relevant to the benefit-burden
analysis. 15 The Commission, however, further conditioned what it
meant by adopting the infant's own perspective:
For many adults, life with severe physical or mental handicap
would seem so burdensome as to offer no benefits. However, this
assessment arises largely from the adults' existing hopes and
aspirations that would be forever unfulfilled. From the
perspective of an infant who can be helped to develop realistic
goals and satisfactions, such frustrations need not occur. 6
With this understanding, surrogates are put on guard against the
influence of their own psychological predispositions and socio-
cultural attachments in making benefit-burden assessments for their
young, unencumbered offspring-strictly speaking, it is not their life
experience that matters.
Put more forcefully, a normal view of the meaning and value of
certain life experiences is not relevant to a newborn's best interest
analysis because she has no appreciable sense of normalcy. One
striking conclusion that can be drawn from this decision-making
constraint seems to be as follows: while a parent might readily refuse
life-saving medical treatment for himself because he prefers not to be
left mentally and physically worse off, he may not choose the same
for his newborn child based on highly personalized concerns about an
untoward outcome. "[T]he concept of 'benefit' excludes honoring
idiosyncratic views that might be allowed if a person were deciding
about his or her own treatment."'
17
Having sketched the contours of what the Best Interests Standard
means for newborns, the Commission next attempts to guide actual
bedside decision-making about whether to proceed with medical
15. See discussion infra Part H.B.4.
16. Commission, supra note 9, at 219 n.79 (citing Karen M. Metzler, Human and Handicapped, in
MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 358 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1976).
17. Commission, supra note 9, at 218. The Commission does not further define what counts as
idiosyncratic.
20091
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therapy for those who are seriously ill by dividing potential
treatments into three possible categories: 1) clearly beneficial, 2)
ambiguous or uncertain, or 3) futile. 18 Initial treatment classification
is privileged to the attending physician, but the Commission
acknowledged that this assessment may be problematic and provided
that there may be occasions to allow for intra-institutional or external
court re-assessment.
19
The Commission first offers a paradigmatic example of a case in
which available treatment should be regarded as clearly beneficial:
"[t]he handicaps of Down Syndrome . . . do not justify failing to
provide medically proven treatment, such as surgical correction of a
blocked intestinal tract." 20 This conclusion would thus appear to
foreclose the ethical acceptability of any alternate benefit-burden
evaluation by surrogates. According to the Commission, it is in the
best interests of newborns with Down Syndrome to receive life-
saving treatment regardless of what parents or physicians might
think.
21
Regarding futile therapies, the Commission again offers two
specific clinical examples: "anencephaly or certain severe cardiac




21. The Commission concludes so despite acknowledging a background prevalence of contrary
professional attitude:
Surveys of physicians show that most would follow parental wishes to stop treatment for
at least some abnormal infants. When California pediatricians were polled in 1975 about
how they would treat a Down Syndrome baby with a life-threatening intestinal
obstruction (assuming parental agreement and immunity from existing laws), 17% said
they would do "everything humanly possible" to save the baby's life, while 61% would
give ordinary medical care but "nothing heroic" (meaning the baby would die without the
operation to remove the obstruction). In a national study in 1977, pediatricians and
pediatric surgeons were asked whether they would acquiesce in a parental decision not to
treat a Down Syndrome infant having congenital heart disease. Even though immunity
from the law was not mentioned, 85% of the pediatric surgeons responding and 65% of
the pediatricians said they would follow the parents' wishes. A third study found that
51% of the pediatricians surveyed in Massachusetts would not recommend surgery for a
Down Syndrome infant with intestinal blockage.
Commission, supra note 9, at 208.
22. Commission, supra note 9, at 219.
[Vol. 25:4
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VALUING NEWBORN HUMAN LIFE
states that potential treatments "do not help the child, are sometimes
painful for the infant. .. , and offer no reasonable probability for
saving life for a substantial period., 23 In terms of connecting futility
to duration of survival, the Commission specifically states that "[t]he
moment of death for these infants might be delayed for a short time"
with on-going therapy and limits this classification to those babies
who will die within "hours or days, not years." 24 It acknowledges that
disagreement may exist between physicians and parents about when a
set of medical facts might be sufficient to constitute futility.
Significantly, it concludes that therapy deemed futile by physicians
should still be given in cases where parents request it as long as
"substantial suffering for the child" can be avoided.25 In such cases,
the Commission also makes room for conscientious provider
objection and grants the opportunity for such individuals to withdraw
from clinical care.
The Commission finally details what it considers to be the most
problematic category: so-called "ambiguous" cases, where opinions
might acceptably diverge on how to weigh severity of burden or
amount of benefit and handle uncertainty. The Commission perceives
that the majority of clinical cases involving seriously ill newborns
should result in a classification that treatment is either beneficial or
futile; few cases will truly be ambiguous. It then provides two
specific case examples of ambiguity: "a child with a debilitating and
painful disease who might live with therapy, but only for a year or so,
or a respirator dependent premature infant whose long-term prognosis
becomes bleaker with each passing day."26 These examples are
notably constrained in terms of predicted outcomes and both describe
patients whose current conditions and future prognoses seem well
forecasted. The first case emphasizes pain and limited life span; the
second case, dependence on medical technology and a rapidly
23. Id.
24. Id. at 219. There is an apparent inconsistency here, in that anencephalic babies who are
mechanically ventilated can conceivably live for years.
25. Commission, supra note 9, at 220.
26. Id.
20091
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deteriorating condition. Though not explicitly stated, these examples
could be understood to mean that ambiguity about treatment should
only attach after some concrete, patient-specific facts are available
for evaluation.
Consistent with this interpretation, the Commission rejected
adoption of pre-determined categorical thresholds that might govern
treatment choices prior to birth:
[Objective] criteria would be justified if there were evidence that
their adoption would lead to decisions more often being made
correctly ....
... [B]irth weight limits or checklists for severity of spina bifida
have not been shown to improve the quality of decisionmaking in
ambiguous and complex cases. Instead, their use seems to
remove the weight of responsibility too readily from those who
should have to face the value questions-parents and health care
providers."
Here is a potentially very important practical constraint on providers
and parents. The Commission argues that, prior to birth, in cases
where available treatment is not obviously futile, fetuses with a
chance for survival as newborns ought not automatically be lumped
into a "no treatment" box just because treatment is also not obviously
beneficial. Such pre-categorization might serve a goal of expediency,
and in many cases, ease adult anxieties, but to the Commission, this
seems to come at too high a price.
Taken in totality, it is plausible to read the President's Commission
as articulating a very narrowly focused decision-making standard that
demands surrogates focus their exclusive attention on the possible
well-being of an individual newborn patient. Consistent with this
interpretation, the Commission insists that decision makers "must
have reason to believe that the patient will be maximally benefited"
27. Commission, supra note 9, at 221, 223.
[VoL 25:4
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by their choice regarding treatment. 28 Certain considerations such as
"the value that others find in the continuation of the patient's life,
perhaps in terms of their estimates of the patient's actual or potential
productivity or social contribution," have no place in the interests
assessment. 29 Other surrogate claims, such as an assertion that an
incompetent would elevate the emotional or financial toll on her
family over her own survival interests, require "especially stringent
standards of evidence." 30 Because newborns are by definition never
competent, the Commission prohibits imputation of such altruism.
II. EXTENSION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO
CASES OF DOUBTFUL VIABILITY
I now extend the President's Commission's analysis to the case of
a neonate born extremely prematurely whose long-term survival is
doubtful. I choose this clinical case because, historically, obstetric
and neonatal providers have approached the decision to resuscitate
such babies with trepidation. Professional hesitation stems largely
from a conscientious concern that, even with the best available
medical care, such newborns face depressingly low chances of long-
term survival and high chances of significant functional morbidity
with survival. More controversially, it is possible to contend that
providing treatment in cases of doubtful viability would be futile or
not in the best interests of these newborns. With the President's
Commission's framework for decision-making in mind, I hope to cast
suspicion on such a characterization.
A. Professional Approach
In the United States, no uniform policy has governed the approach
providers or parents actually take in deciding about treatment in cases
of doubtful viability at the time of birth. There is a specter of federal
28. Commission, supra note 9, at 135 n.42.
29. Id.
30. Commission, supra note 9, at 136.
20091
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regulatory policy that lurks in the shadows of normative clinical
practice, but it remains unclear what practical effect it may exert on
actual decision-making.31  No standardized template exists to
communicate information about likely outcomes in such cases to
expectant parents. Individual providers are largely left to their own
conscience in deciding how to approach antenatal counseling and
delivery room management. 32 Predictably, some variability across
physicians and institutions exists.
33
Attitudinal surveys suggest that most providers in the United States
are reluctant to initiate potentially life-sustaining medical care for
neonates born below twenty-three weeks. 34 The authors of a recent,
large national survey published in 2007 noted the following:
[The] lower edge of viability, as determined functionally by the
self-reported behavior of neonatologists in the delivery room, is
500 g/23 weeks and has remained there for at least the past
several years. The large majority of neonatologists in 1996 and
in 2003 would not resuscitate infants below that BW/GA limit,
regardless of the expressed wishes of the parents.35
In that study, for neonates born below twenty-three weeks or 500
grams, only 36% of respondents would honor parents' expressed
wishes to initiate treatment, 57% would provide "comfort care"
alone, and 4% would provide "full resuscitation.' 36 Respondents
were also asked to rank the relative importance of six possible
31. Sayeed, supra note 8, at e576-e585.
32. See generally Russell W. Chesney, Children As Clinical Research Subjects, 147 J. PEDIATRICS
579 (2005); Joseph W. Kaempf et al., Medical Staff Guidelines for Periviability Pregnancy Counseling
and Medical Treatment of Extremely Premature Infants, 117 PEDIATRICS 22 (2006).
33. Maureen Hack & Avroy A. Fanaroff, Outcomes of Children of Extremely Low Birth Weight and
GestationalAge in the 1990s, 53 EARLY HUMAN DEV. 193, 194 (1999).
34. Justin P. Lavin, Attitudes of Obstetric and Pediatric Health Care Providers Toward
Resuscitation of Infants Who Are Born at the Margins of Viability, 118 PEDIATRICS S169 (2006);
Jehanna M. Peerzada et al., Delivery Room Decision-Making at the Threshold of Viability, 145 J.
PEDIATRICS 492 (2004); Jaideep Singh et al., Resuscitation in the "Gray Zone" of Viability:
Determining Physician Preferences and Predicting Infant Outcomes, 120 PEDIATRICS 519 (2007).
35. Singh et al., supra note 34, at 523.
36. Id. at 521. The authors do not further define what is meant by "full resuscitation."
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concerns-viability, futility, quality of life, resources, litigation,
religion-in informing their initial treatment decisions. The study
authors expressed reassurance about their findings; informants were
"well-motivated" insofar as "patient-oriented outcome variables"
(futility, viability, quality of life) were emphasized over "societal or
personal concerns" as reasons for their choices regarding the
appropriateness of treatment.
37
One other assessment of provider attitudes toward treatment
decisions in cases of doubtful viability bears brief mention because it
broaches the question with the President's Commission's framework
squarely in mind.38 Investigators in this regional six-state study asked
respondents to choose whether available treatment should be
regarded as clearly beneficial, futile, or of uncertain benefit for
neonates born at several early gestational ages. Below twenty-three
weeks, 93% of physicians regarded treatment as futile and only 33%
were willing to provide such treatment upon parental request.39 The
investigators also queried about motivating factors in cases of
uncertain benefit and found that the medical condition of the neonate
at the time of delivery and the likelihood of death were most
important to respondents in deciding whether to initiate or withhold
treatment; long-term suffering of the infant was ranked next,
followed by likelihood of mental retardation and likelihood of
cerebral palsy.
40
The professional attitudes predominant in both of these surveys
largely mirror the opinion of the Neonatal Resuscitation Program
Steering Committee which, in conjunction with the American Heart
Association (NRP/AHA), includes in its formal guideline that a
gestational age less than twenty-three weeks or birth weight less than
400 grams might constitute sufficient grounds for providers to
unilaterally refuse to offer resuscitation.4 What influence, if any, the
37. Id. at 523.
38. Peerzada, supra note 34, at 492-93.
39. Id. at 494.
40. Id. at 496.
41. See Part 13: Neonatal Resuscitation Guidelines, 112 CIRCULATION IV-188, IV-193 (2005).
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opinion of the NRP/AHA exerts on the opinions of actual providers
of neonatal care is difficult to ascertain. It may also be possible that
NRP/AHA policy is rather more reflective of the apparent consensus
findings in these observational studies. Regardless, this collective
body of empirical evidence suggests a broad inclination on the part of
neonatal providers in the United States to unilaterally demarcate
situations within clinical practice where they may justifiably decide
against initiating potentially life-saving medical treatment for
extremely premature newborns regardless of the opinion of others
who may also have a stake in the outcome.42
B. Analysis of the Professional Approach
The NRP/AHA chose to offer examples of objective criteria (birth
weight and gestational age) that might systematically exclude some
live born neonates from receiving resuscitative therapy without
individual evaluation after birth. The President's Commission, on the
other hand, advised against the use of such across-the-board
thresholds unless it could be adequately demonstrated that "correct"
decisions were reliably obtained. 43  If such cases can non-
controversially be regarded as instances of futility, then no problem
should exist. And indeed, a superficial analysis might conclude that
because consensus opinion among providers appears to be that
treatment below twenty-three weeks is futile, a policy that reflects
such opinion is acceptable.
But is it the case that initiating resuscitative treatment to a neonate
born below twenty-three weeks is futile?44 In order to answer this
42. Istvan Seri & Jaquelyn Evans, Limits of Viability: Definition of the Grey Zone, 28 J.
PERINATOLOGY S4, S7 (2008).
43. See discussion supra Part L
44. This is not meant to be just a rhetorical or academic question. In February 2007, the national
media covered the hospital discharge of a "miracle" baby previously born just under twenty-two weeks
from a Florida hospital. This newsworthy case represented the earliest reported survival of an American
neonate because conception was achieved by in vitro fertilization with precise dating. At the time of
discharge, the almost five-month-old had suffered a mild brain hemorrhage and needed oxygen for
chronic lung disease, but her discharging doctors believed that her "health concerns [would] not have
major long-term effects." A neonatologist involved in the infant's care remarked that there may be a
"need to reconsider our standard for viability in light of [this] case. Over the years, the technology that
[Vol. 25:4
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question, a transparent definition of futility is first needed. That
clinicians have at times been inclined to take advantage of futility's
notorious imprecision and multiplicity of intended meanings has been
criticized by close observers of medical practice.45 Perhaps the least
problematic definition of futility is physiological, which roughly
means that, even with all available treatment, death can only be
postponed for a short period of time. The President's Commission's
discussion of futile treatment in the context of seriously ill newborns
most closely corresponds with such a tight conceptualization.
46
1. Survival Data
Given a pervasive professional attitude with respect to viability
under twenty-three weeks, actual survival data for neonates born
below this threshold are quite limited.47 Because almost no neonates
are resuscitated below this gestational age "cutoff," there are
plausible grounds to worry about the perpetuation of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Indeed, in the absence of ubiquitous provider commitment
to attempt resuscitation when newborn viability is unlikely, one
recent commentator suggested that published "survival rates may
underestimate maximum survival possible. '48 What survival data are
available must be interpreted cautiously because just as individual
physiological fitness affects outcome, so do the background
conditions which describe where, when, and how a neonate below
twenty-three weeks is born.
49
we have available to save these premature babies has improved dramatically." Tom Strode, Premature
Baby Who Had Record Survival May Change View of Unborn, Specialists Say, BAPTIST PRESS, Feb. 26,
2007, http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?[D=25045; see also 21-Week-Old Miracle Baby Survives at
Baptist Hospital, Feb. 19, 2007, http://www.nbc6.net/health/i1056409/detail.html.
45. See Paul R. Helfi et al., The Rise and Fall of the Futility Movement, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 293,
295 (2000).
46. See discussion supra Part I.
47. See Hack & Fanaroff, supra note 33, at 195.
48. John M. Lorenz, Management Decisions in Extremely Premature Infants, 8 SEMINARS IN
NEONATOLOGY 475,477 (2003).
49. There is no question that to optimize whatever innate chances exist for survival, an extremely
premature newborn would do well not only to be born to parents who are committed to maximizing that
chance, but also at an institution capable of providing the highest quality intensive care right after birth,
20091
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Large epidemiological studies from the United Kingdom and
United States verify this last observation."0 Investigators in the
United Kingdom undertook to prospectively collect outcomes data
for neonates born between twenty and twenty-six weeks' gestation
during a ten-month period in all of the 276 maternity units operating
in the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1995. As an observational
study, there was no attempt to control for the quality of available
medical services or the attitude of providers at neonatal point of
entry:
In a study such as this, with data from a large number of centers
of various sizes and staffing structures and inevitable differences
of approach to the birth of an extremely preterm infant, we could
neither standardize nor validate definitions of resuscitation
attempts; thus, the delivery-room treatment of those reported to
show signs of life but not admitted to the neonatal intensive care
unit was not recorded. It is a matter of conjecture whether a more
aggressive universal policy of resuscitation would have altered
these outcomes."'
There were 4,004 early births during the ten-month time study period
that met criteria for evaluation. 1,185 extremely premature newborns
were reported to have shown signs of life. 843 of these babies were
admitted to a neonatal intensive care unit and the remainder died in
the delivery room. 314 infants survived to be discharged home,
representing an approximately 39% rate of survival for all admitted
newborns and a 7.8% rate for all recorded births. More detailed
analysis revealed that between twenty-two and twenty-three weeks
and at a time when the available providers are also prepared and willing to use all of the possible
therapeutic tools at their disposal.
50. See, e.g., James A. Lemons et al., Very Low Birth Weight Outcomes of the National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development Neonatal Research Network, January 1995 Through December
1996, 107 PEDIATRICS 1 (2001); Neil Marlow et al., Neurologic and Developmental Disability at Six
Years of Age After Birth, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 9 (2005); Jon E. Tyson et al., Intensive Care for
Extreme Prematurity-Moving Beyond Gestational Age, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1672, 1679 (2008).
51. Nicholas S. Wood, Neurologic and Developmental Disability After Extremely Preterm Birth, 343
NEW ENG. J. MED. 378, 383 (2000).
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completed gestation, 16% of newborns were admitted to a NICU, and
1% survived to discharge; between twenty-three and twenty-four
weeks, 54% were admitted, and 11% survived to discharge.
52
By way of comparison, in the United States, a collaborative group
of academic intensive care nurseries known as the Neonatal Research
Network of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development reported survival outcomes from its centers between
January 1995 and December 1996. 53 In this publication, 21% of
neonates (twelve of fifty-six total infants) born between twenty-two
and twenty-three completed gestational weeks by best obstetrical
estimate survived to discharge, whereas between twenty-three and
twenty-four weeks roughly 30% survived.54 In 2008, the same group
published a much more sophisticated survival analysis of neonates
born between twenty-two and twenty-five weeks for the subsequent
years 1998 through 2003. 55 In this latter study, nearly 4,500 neonates
were prospectively followed after birth, and 83% of these babies
received intensive care in the form of (at least) mechanical
ventilation. However, only 23% of neonates born below twenty-three
weeks received intensive care as compared to 99% of those born
above twenty-five weeks.
56
Detailed statistical analysis of this large U.S. cohort allowed the
investigators to conclude that a single-factor model (such as
gestational age or birth weight) was poorly predictive of outcome as
compared to a model that included five clinical factors. 57 A more
robust estimation of clinical outcomes for both mortality and degree
of morbidity can be generated by inputting gestational age, weight,
sex, exposure to antenatal steroids, and singleton versus multiple
birth into the calculation. The authors conclude: "Our findings
52. See Marlow et al., supra note 50, at 16.
53. See Lemons et al., supra note 50, at 1.
54. Id. at 4. The difference in survival on the two sides of the Atlantic at least in part likely reflects
point of entry into neonatal care. All of the NICHD centers are capable of providing advanced intensive
care. The same cannot be said of all of the 276 British maternity units.
55. See Tyson et al., supra note 50, at 1672.
56. Id. at 1677.
57. Id. at 1679.
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challenge the widespread use of gestational-age thresholds alone in
deciding whether to administer intensive care to extremely premature
infants." 58 In the spirit of improving actual clinical practice, these
investigators also produced an "estimator" based on aggregate
outcomes for the study cohort, which is freely accessible on the
internet. 59 This calculator produces interesting results. For example,
with the following inputs: twenty-two weeks, 450 grams, female
gender, exposure to antenatal steroids, and singleton birth, a 21%
chance of survival is generated for a mechanically ventilated neonate.
If the gestational age is increased to twenty-three weeks, but gender
is changed to male while holding the remaining variables constant,
the chance of survival only marginally increases to 23%.
2. Analysis of Initial Claim of Futility
The U.S. Network's latest study is provocative for at least two
reasons: first, it calls into question a traditional normative clinical
practice of basing treatment decisions exclusively on one factor such
as estimated gestational age or birth weight; second, it slams the door
on blanket claims that treatment below twenty-three weeks ought
conclusively to be regarded as physiologically futile. 60 No neonatal
58. Id.
59. NICHD Neonatal Research Network (NRN): Extremely Preterm Birth Outcome Data,
http://www.nichd.nih.gov/about/org/cdbpm/pp/progepbo/epbo case.cfin.
60. In 2007, perhaps with forehand knowledge, the Committee on Fetus and Newborn, a leadership
group within the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), specifically considered and rejected a
treatment classification scheme based on gestational age or birth weight. It offered several reasons for its
decision:
[We] decided against this categorical approach for several reasons. First, the prognosis
for extremely premature infants is influenced by other factors besides gestational age,
such as fetal gender and corticosteroid exposure. Second, . . . we felt that these
demarcation lines are not fixed but have moved over time and may continue to do so.
Third, the concept of standard gestational-age cutoffs for active intervention is
problematic because there is considerable center-to-center variability in outcome below
25 weeks' gestation, both in mortality and morbidity; . . . much of the variability in
outcome among centers results from differences in the attitudes and beliefs of medical
staff regarding the potential for intact survival at very early gestation.
Edward F. Bell et al., Noninitiation or Withdrawal of Intensive Care for High-Risk Newborns: In Reply,
119 PEDIATRICS 1267, 1268 (2007). In its policy statement, the Committee on Fetus and Newborn
[Vol. 25:4
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provider concerned with issues of justice could plausibly maintain
that a statistical difference in survival of 2% between a twenty-two-
week female and a twenty-three-week male is sufficient to decisively
change a judgment about the appropriateness of initiating intensive
care.
There is the further arithmetical puzzle of trying to equate a one in
five chance of long-term survival with a claim of physiological
futility. Even if the most accurate portrayal of survival probabilities
would describe a range of possibility (say zero to 20%), a plausible
basis for such a claim is lacking; a robust conception of futility does
not so easily accommodate a wide statistical spectrum of survival
outcome. Though not perfectly analogous, a physician could not tell a
competent adult patient who faced a one in five (or even one in ten)
chance of survival with treatment that such care was not indicated
because it stood no reasonable chance of working.61 A neonatal
patient obviously cannot protest as an adult patient, but incompetency
does not magically evaporate the underlying objection.
This is not to deny that providers might have other reasons to try
and justify a unilateral decision not to offer treatment, but any claim
sounding in futility must be considered question-begging. Perhaps
cognizant of that rejoinder, the 2005 NRP/AHA guideline does offer
a broader argument in its published opinion: "unacceptably high
offered a strategy for care that follows from the anticipated prognosis: 1) no treatment when "early death
is highly likely and survival would be accompanied by high risk of unacceptably severe morbidity," 2)
treatment when "survival is likely and risk of unacceptably severe morbidity is low," and 3) treatment
according to parental desires when the "prognosis is uncertain but likely to be very poor and survival
may be associated with a diminished quality of life for the child." Committee on Fetus and Newborn,
Noninitiation or Withdrawal of Intensive Care for High-Risk Newborns, 119 PEDIATRICS 401, 402
(2007). This decision-making approach bears close resemblance to the tripartite treatment classification
scheme of the 1983 President's Commission. Key qualifiers such as "highly likely," "high risk," and
"unacceptably severe" are left undefined; as such, the Committee leaves some space for clinicians and
parents to fill in the inescapable value judgments. This opinion does not specifically supplant the
NRP/AHA policy guideline.
61. See Helft, supra note 45, at 293 ("Several authors sought consensus by attempting to determine
empirically the threshold for a physician's judgment that further treatment would be futile. In various
studies, the threshold, expressed in terms of the physician's prediction of the chance of survival, ranged
from zero to sixty percent, although responses tended to cluster around five percent. Critics argued that
the great variability in responses would make consensus on a specific threshold for decisions about
futility unlikely.").
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morbidity is likely among the rare survivors.' '62 With this
clarification, it becomes transparent that much professional clinical
perspective is animated not only by a concern about chance of
survival but also by the quality of that survival.
3. Data on Long-Term Outcomes
Professional concern about unacceptably high morbidity is
informed by follow-up data collected during two decades
documenting permanent diminishments in extremely premature
survivors' cognitive and developmental capabilities as older
children.63 The 1995 U.K. study described earlier prospectively
collected outcomes data on all survivors of extremely premature birth
who reached six years of age. 64 The surviving batch of children
underwent standardized cognitive and neurological assessments at
early school-age and was matched against a control group of children
born at full-term in the same study year. Between twenty-two and
twenty-three weeks, a total of 138 neonates were reportedly live born,
of which twenty-two were initially sent for further intensive care.
Two of the twenty-two neonates who received some form of
sustained medical intervention survived to discharge and were
followed up at the six-year assessment.65 One child was found to be
mildly disabled and the other severely disabled.66 The U.S. NICHD
(National Institute of Child Health and Human Development)
62. See Part 13: Neonatal Resuscitation Guidelines, supra note 41, at IV-193.
63. See Hack & Fanaroff, supra note 33, at 194.
64. See Marlow et al., supra note 50, at 9.
65. No information is provided regarding the reasons treatment was stopped for the other twenty
newborns who initially received intensive care. Presumably, some died despite all efforts, and others had
treatment withheld out of concern for severity of injury or predicted poor outcome. See discussion supra
Part [LB. 1; Marlow supra note 50, at 16.
66. See Marlow, supra note 50, at 16. Investigators defined disability as severe if it was considered
likely to make the child highly dependent on caregivers and included nonambulant cerebral palsy, an IQ
score more than three standard deviations below the mean, profound sensorineural hearing loss, or
blindness; "moderate" if it was considered likely that reasonable independence could be reached, and if
it included ambulant cerebral palsy, an IQ score two to three standard deviations below the mean,
sensorineural hearing loss that was corrected with a hearing aid, or impaired vision without blindness;
"mild" if the child was found to have neurologic signs with minimal functional consequences or other
impairments such as squints or refractive errors. Id.
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Network also evaluated eighteen to twenty-two month developmental
outcomes for survivors of the study cohort followed from 1998 to
67sttsiaan2003. Investigators extended their statistical analysis and projected
that had intensive care been universally initiated for all neonates born
between twenty-two and twenty-three weeks in their study cohort,
among the small number of survivors (zero to 9% of all treated),
between zero and slightly over 50% would have survived without
profound impairment and between zero and approximately 33%
would have survived without impairment.
68
4. Analysis of a Broadened Claim Regarding Unacceptably High
Morbidity
Based on this kind of data, all of us might reasonably agree that
there is good basis to worry about significant, life-long
developmental burdens that are likely to manifest in survivors of
extremely premature birth. And, no doubt, some conscientious
neonatal providers feel obligated to avoid introducing into the
population children with grave permanent handicaps. The authors of
the 2008 NICHD study rather strikingly contend "a strength" of their
work includes the "assessment of profound impairment, an outcome
that some persons consider to be worse than death., 69 This assertion
brings to the foreground the fundamental dilemma facing all
stakeholders in cases of improbable newborn survival: we must make
a judgment about the value of another human being's life, before that
individual is really capable of appreciably experiencing it. Is a
unilateral professional medical value judgment that treatment is not
indicated when there is only a 15% chance of survival with an 80%
67. See Tyson et al., supra note 50, at 1673.
68. See Tyson et al., supra note 50, at 1678-79. Degree of impairment was defined by reference to
the measured results of standardized, age-appropriate developmental testing. Survivors were classified
as impaired if they performed poorly on one of two developmental tests, or they had moderate or severe
cerebral palsy, or bilateral blindness, or bilateral hearing loss requiring amplification. Impairment was
profound if mental development could not be tested, or if the child always needed adult assistance to
move.
69. Id. at 1679.
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chance of severe disability acceptable? What if a parent disagrees?70
Providers of neonatal care are entitled to interpret statistically
predicted long-term outcomes for neonates born extremely
prematurely, but it is one value judgment among many. Physicians do
not, by virtue of their technical expertise, possess any special insight
into this enduring moral problem. 7 1 Parents, child advocates
representing the state, and judges might also all have thoughtful,
informed, and relevant opinions.
On the interpretation of the President's Commission's framework
for decision-making offered here, it is plausible to conclude that
initial treatment would confer a greater potential benefit to a neonate
precariously positioned at birth between twenty-two and twenty-three
weeks than "comfort care" alone.72 Perhaps needless to say, from the
perspective of one who desires to remain alive, the provision of life-
sustaining treatment is an all-or-nothing proposition. When
maximizing the chance of survival is the primary interest of such a
person, the fact that the statistical probability of success is 99% or
1% should not matter-what matters is that we prioritize whatever
chance exists over all other concerns.
The President's Commission insists that a surrogate's treatment
decision must be thought to maximally benefit the newborn since we
cannot discern his or her subjective wishes. In the hierarchy of
possible benefits for a newborn, survival (I contend) is necessarily a
default priority. It is a precondition to measuring all other potential
benefits and burdens. This does not mean that the benefit of survival
cannot be trumped; rather, it means that in the absence of strong
evidence to the contrary, we ought to assume that a newborn would
70. Again, these are not rhetorical questions. Decisions about whether to treat doubtfully viable
newborns are made nearly every day in the United States and elsewhere and will continue to need to be
made for the foreseeable future.
71. See Robert M. Veatch, Why Physicians Cannot Determine if Care Is Futile, 42 J. AM. GERIATRIC
Soc'y 871 (1994).
72. At a minimum, because the claim for physiological futility has hopefully been dispelled, a case
for ambiguity exists--which would argue for at least respecting initial parent requests for treatment
below twenty-three weeks. I do think there is room to push for the more provocative claim that it is a net
benefit from the infant's perspective to provide initial treatment below twenty-five weeks regardless of
what any other stakeholder thinks.
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want to maximize his or her chance of survival. This is precisely the
position of the court in Montalvo.73
This is also, in fact, how many physicians instinctively rank the
interests of premature neonates born beyond twenty-five weeks
gestation who possess much better up-front odds of survival without
serious morbidity. 74 In one of the attitudinal provider surveys
previously cited, 91% of respondents were prepared to provide
treatment in such cases regardless of parental wishes to the
contrary.75 The fact that physicians are prepared to override a natural
surrogate's informed decision about the disutility of medical care
suggests that we accept the general proposition that newborns possess
independent interests that can be considered separate and distinct
from parents. Moreover, it suggests that survival is most often the
paramount interest we ought to be concerned about.
Regarding quality-of-projected-life, the President's Commission
insists that surrogates take seriously the notion that it is the
perspective of the infant that matters most. This qualifier, I argue,
makes it exceptionally difficult to turn a risk of unacceptable
outcome (even if great) into a presumption about what should follow.
Why shouldn't we expect the perspective of a neonate born at
twenty-two weeks to be as follows: if treatment is the only chance I
have at a small, but real opportunity for a not unbearable human life,
I'd be inclined to risk the high chance of death and high chance of
permanent disability for that small chance of survival, of creating my
own autobiography. If I die despite being treated, I am almost
certainly no worse off than had treatment not been started. If I
survive, and things go terribly bad for me, others can make a more
informed choice to end my life once it is clearer that the life that I
actually experience is "worse than death. "
73. Montalvo v. Borkovek, 647 N.W.2d 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
74. See Peerzada et al., supra note 33, at 495; Singh, supra note 34, at 519; Seri, supra note 41, at
S6.
75. See Peerzada et al., supra note 33, at 493.
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Some may recognize in this narrative a bow to the philosopher
Derek Parfit's non-identity problem.76 For a specific person standing
in an ex ante position who has yet to experience a life full of
avoidable burdens, that encumbered life will still, almost always,
seem more valuable than no life at all. It is death's ineffability
coupled with genuine uncertainty about how one might eventually
adapt or cope to an objectively compromised human existence that
appropriately pulls us toward a life-extending moral sensibility. This
narrative also reinforces an intuition that individual human beings
can be regarded as distinct and separable from one another even
when cognitively na'ive.
77
In order to make this argument, there is no need to deny that all
rational persons ought to prefer a life without significant burdens.
Instead, it means that we should not casually annihilate an impersonal
(but subjectively-derived), foundational interest in survival for the
sake of an impersonal (but objectively-derived) interest in avoiding
an unburdened future life.78 The problem of risk assessment is
inescapable in these clinical situations. My modest claim is that it is,
often times, nothing more than an assertion to insist that the
probabilities of an acceptable outcome for the newborn are too poor
to justify an attempt at rescue. Someone is passing judgment on the
available statistics and that judgment is filled with values that deserve
unbundling.
76. See generally DEREK PARFiT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
77. The law certainly assumes that persons are distinct from one another, and regardless of the fit, it
seems obligated to formally do so at the moment a baby is separated from a pregnant woman. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133 (1973).
78. The President's Commission's analysis suggests another argument for this claim about the
primacy of newborn survival interests. It concluded neonatal intensive care treatment in cases of Down
Syndrome was paradigmatically beneficial. Commission, supra note 9, at 6. Yet, we know that a non-
trivial percentage of these newborns will end up most severely retarded, with untestable cognitive
capabilities using standardized tests; we know that a non-trivial percentage of these newborns will end
up entirely dependent on adult care in the home or a nursing facility because of their profound disability.
Despite the statistical certainty of these devastating outcomes in some fraction of these children, the
Commission did not regard treatment to the class of such newborns as ambiguous. If the concern in
cases of doubtful viability is not so much about survival, but instead quality-of-survival, it is difficult to
reconcile this worry with the position of the President's Commission in cases of Down Syndrome. If
consistency across newborns matters (an issue of justice), we should be prepared to treat like cases
similarly.
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A small set of experiential data lends indirect empirical credibility
to the logic of the ex ante argument. In 2007, U.S. investigators
published an analysis of results from a series of self-assessments
made by former very low birth weight and premature infants who had
survived into their twenties.79 The authors concluded that these
persons "may have adapted to their functional limitations by [twenty]
years of age" and could find "no influence on young adult
satisfaction with health, subjective well-being, or health perceptions,
despite the persistence of neurosensory impairments and their
associated long-term medical, surgical, and psychosocial
problems."80 Similar findings are documented in a series of studies
tracking long-term outcomes for a cohort of 150 very low birth
weight survivors for over twenty years in Canada.8 No significant
differences in self-reported quality of life between normal controls
and these survivors were found, despite the latter group reporting
"more functional limitations in cognition, sensation, mobility, and
self-care. 82 In discussing their findings, the Canadian investigators
critically commented:
[Children] born with impairments... have never known life to
be any different. They have adapted to their disabilities while
growing up and perhaps made the necessary adjustments with
less conscious effort. When we reported [that these] adolescents
... viewed their lives fairly positively[,] ... the findings were
received with some skepticism and disbelief ... [Some] pointed
to some element of denial and self-deception as mechanisms for
coping. This is one interpretation. However, the consistency with
which our cohort . . . described themselves as having good
79. Maureen Hack et al., Self-Perceived Health, Functioning and Well-Being of Very-Low-Birth-
Weight Infants at Age 20 Years, 151 J. PEDIATRICS 635, 635 (2007).
80. Hack et al., supra note 79, at 639.
81. Saroj Saigal et al., Self-Perceived Health-Related Quality of Life of Former Extremely Low Birth
Weight Infants at Young Adulthood, 118 PEDIATRICS 1140, 1140 (2006).
82. Id.
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quality of life, taken together with the improvements in their life
trajectories to adulthood, support the concept that this is real.83
Such real world observations must be regarded cautiously. It would
be a mistake to presume their general applicability or transferability
to all survivors of extreme prematurity, particularly since the marker
of very low birth weight does not always correspond with extreme
physiologic immaturity.8 4  Borderline viable babies that survived
twenty years ago may be quite different than the ones we must deal
with today. On the other hand, the recent U.K. and U.S. outcome
studies that document significant handicaps in more recent survivors
from the late 1990s also require substantial qualification. Though
categorization of disability is objectively based, such a medicalized
documentation of impairments offers only one particular view of
"outcome." Such point-in-time depictions in toddlers and pre-
schoolers cannot be sufficient in and of themselves to make sweeping
judgments about these children as developing moral beings. The
findings do not automatically confirm an "unacceptably high"
morbidity without someone else's accompanying value judgment;
they do not make an open-and-shut case about an outcome's being
"worse than death., 85 We must remind ourselves here: worse than
death to whom?8
6
83. Id. at 1145-46.
84. The studies also do not capture any self-perceptions about quality of life in the most cognitively
compromised survivors. Saigal analyzed the caregivers' assessment in such cases. See Saigal, supra note
81.
85. See Tyson et al., supra note 50, at 1679.
86. See Montalvo v. Borkovek, 647 N.W.2d 413. 421 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) ("This determination
could vary greatly based on the parents' beliefs. One set of parents may view a particular disability as
'worse than death,' while another set of parents would not. Such a process, not unreasonably, has
kaleidoscopic, unending implications."). The substantive concern about whose perspective matters is
also well supported by the empirical studies of Peter Libel and colleagues:
To date, there are no perfect measures to determine just how happy people are. And there
is no gold standard to estimate people's subjective quality of life. Nevertheless, whatever
makes up happiness or quality of life, it appears that many illnesses have far less impact
on subjective quality of life than many of us would predict. This is good news. As much
as we strive to reduce the burdens of illness, it is comforting to remember the strength of
the human spirit. At the same time, it is worth remembering how this strength of spirit
complicates quality of life measurement.
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5. Analysis of a Composite Claim Regarding the Burden of
Treatment
Skeptics of my preceding analysis could still argue that should an
extremely premature newborn follow the statistical trend and die, the
initiation of treatment will only have amounted to a net avoidable
burden on the infant. Moreover, the probabilities suggest that
intervention in the majority of cases will amount to nothing more
than our multiplying greatly the number of instances where
unnecessary pain and suffering is forced on otherwise doomed
newborns. In short, the immediate burdens of treatment to many
outweigh the marginal benefit to a few.
Whatever the strengths of this mixed utilitarian calculus across
individuals, at least part of this retort problematically relies on a
retrospective rather than prospective framing of the problem.87 It is
easy to regard failed interventions as avoidable, but my question
remains: should they be examined from the perspective of the about-
to-be born or just-born human being? If that is the view that ought to
matter most, the need to accurately gauge the burdens of treatment, in
particular immediate pain and suffering, becomes paramount. It is
reasonable to argue that one need not endure torture to affect a
fleeting chance of survival. The standard components of neonatal
resuscitative and intensive care include mechanical ventilation,
needle sticks, medications, and uncomfortable handling by providers
from time to time. Are these interventions burdensome enough to
discount a presumed interest in survival?
This is a dubious claim for at least two reasons. First, many
premature neonates who are more mature, with better probabilities of
survival, receive exactly the same interventions immediately after
birth and for days and weeks thereafter, and few stakeholders object
Peter A. Ubel et al., Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring Discrepancies Between Health
State Evaluations of Patients and the General Public, 12 QUALITY OF LIFE RES. 599, 605 (2003); see
also Heather P. Lacey et al., It Must Be Awful for Them: Perspective and Task Context Affects Ratings
for Health Conditions, I JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 146, 146 (2006).
87. See discussion infra Part III.
20091
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 889 2008-2009
)    
  it   i  f 
 
889 
    
l   l  
 t   
iti   
ti    
       
r        
 t    
  
    
l , i ll   
 ti  8   
l ,  
i : l  t   i    i  
t r   
tt  t, t   t  t l     
   
l  t   t t      
     
  l  
rt le  
    
  
i  i      
r t r  t     ,   iliti s f 
   
      
eter . el et aI., se lit  f if   t r  / ri  i ancies t  lth 
State valuations f atients  t e e er l lic,  I   I  s. ,  ( );  
ls  t r .  t I., It t  fol f  : ctive    ts ti s 
f  lt  iti s, 1   I I   ,  
.   t I. 
25
Sayeed: The Problem of Non-Identity in Valuing Newborn Human Life
Published by Reading Room, 2009
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to the burdens of such interventions in those cases. 88 Second, we have
the ability to mitigate pain associated with these interventions with
analgesia. We may not be very good about doing so in practice, but
such a professional failing cannot justify classifying the interventions
as overwhelmingly burdensome. Again, adopting the perspective of
the naive newborn, why shouldn't she have a greater interest in
taking the small chance of long-term subjectively acceptable survival
if her doctors promise to at least attempt to relieve pain adequately
dtiring their rescue efforts?8
9
Treatment that is too painful or causes too much suffering can be
discontinued once enough evidence exists to suggest that a particular
infant's life has become overwhelmed by such burdens. 90 The worst-
off survivors of extreme prematurity are typically hospital-bound for
several months, and opportunities to stop care present themselves in
less dramatic ways than removal of an endotracheal tube.91
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that, as time passes for
such patients, it typically becomes more difficult not to extend life
because demonstrable, intractable pain is much less frequent. And we
88. Can such interventions amount to torture in one instance and standard of care in another simply
by virtue of their chance of working? I think so, but it is not obvious to me that a 0-20% chance of
survival--even with high risk of lifelong disability-is so awful that we ought to consider them too
burdensome. This again requires a value judgment. Thus, I leave it as an open question; nevertheless, if I
adopt the perspective of the newborn most interested in maximizing her chance of survival, I might be
skeptical that the statistical case is easily made.
89. If we choose to emphasize the high probability of death and the immediate burdens of treatment,
it is easy to forget that only with initial intervention can individualized diagnostic and prognostic
information be collected. In cases of ambiguity, the Commission suggests that specific information-
gathering is essential to guide ethical decision-making: "[tihe longer some of these babies survive, the
more reliable the prognosis for the infant becomes and the clearer parents and professionals can be on
whether further treatment is warranted or futile." Commission, supra note 9, at 221.
90. Emotionally, it often feels harder to stop once a human life has started receiving support, but this
should not be an insurmountable obstacle when there is little disagreement about overwhelming burden.
See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2099, 2100
(a comparison of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking, terminal sedation, physician-assisted suicide,
and voluntary active euthanasia).
91. Pragmatically, it is sometimes harder to find something to stop once a human life moves beyond
the need for intensive care, but again, this need not be an insurmountable obstacle when there is no
disagreement about overwhelming burden. A few commentators assert that withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration is morally different in the case of infants and children, but the plausibility of this position is
doubtful. See generally Thomas A. Shannon & James J. Walter, Artificial Nutrition, Hydration:
Assessing Papal Statement. NAT'L CATHOLIC REP., Apr. 16, 2004, at 9.
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have yet to develop an adequate tool to reliably measure infant
suffering.92 Indeed, it seems no small irony that, months after birth,
uncertainty about long-term quality of life for severely injured
survivors of extreme prematurity more often leads to provision of
more life-sustaining care (for example, shunting hydrocephalus and
placing gastrostomy tubes), while, at the time of birth or just before
it, a worry about the risk of these exact same outcomes seems to
provide a rationale to reject initial life-extending interventions. 93
III. A FINAL, PERSONAL REFLECTION ON THE
MORAL IMPORTANCE OF NEWBORN SURVIVAL
I have argued that if we take seriously the claim that it is the
perspective of the newborn that matters most, it should always be
controversial to presume a quick death is better than taking a chance
at life extension in the absence of hard evidence that overwhelming
short or long-term pain and suffering must accompany treatment. Put
in preferred language often found in pediatric clinical ethics, if
primary attention to the newborn's best interests is demanded,
exceedingly few newborns ought to be denied initial possibly life-
saving medical treatment. I have attempted to locate a plausible basis
for this claim within the framework for decision-making provided in
1983 by the President's Commission. The argument is, however,
available independent of the work of the Commission, and remains,
in my opinion, the most important and enduring normative legacy of
the federal Baby Doe regulations.
94
92. See Alexander A. Kon, Neonatal Euthanasia Is Unsupportable: The Groningen Protocol Should
Be Abandoned, in 28 THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 453, 453 (2007) ("Without the testament
of the patient herself as to the nature and magnitude of her suffering, physicians can never accurately
weigh the benefits and burdens of a child's life, and therefore any such system [of euthanasia] would
condemn to death some children whose suffering is not unbearable.").
93. This may simply verify the intuition that providers and parents find it much easier to accept and
cope with an early human death because personal attachments and bonds of affection are less cemented.
The moral importance of this intuition needs further elucidation. See discussion infra Part III.
94. Despite the continued presence of the Baby Doe regulations, law on this issue in the United
States remains largely passive: it reacts to, rather than compels, action. Judges only face neonatal
treatment dilemmas involving real children with developing biographies after a value conflict has arisen.
In such cases, the non-identity puzzle no longer exists as philosophical exercise. When a stakeholder
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As long as it is 'plausible to claim that an individualistic,
exclusively patient-centered interpretation of best interests is correct,
an advocate for a newborn can turn a modicum of uncertainty about
outcomes or ambiguity about the correct balancing of benefits and
burdens into a defensible rationale to prevent life-ending clinical
decisions.95 It is surprising that despite the complete logic of this
position, few involved in actually providing neonatal intensive care
or who have expertly commented on life-ending decisions for
neonates eschew allegiance to the Best Interests Standard. 96
As mentioned in the introduction to this essay, interpretations of
the Best Interests Standard are not amenable to conclusive proof. It
may be that many participants in and close observers of neonatal
intensive care are comfortable with a working ethical paradigm that
on-the-ground admits of several possible meanings.97 It may be that
parents and providers are comfortable knowing that on any given day
in any given two hospitals, the best interests of extremely premature
newborns facing basically exactly the same odds of survival and risk
of morbidity will be evaluated oppositely under the standard.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of declarative law with one eye
toward prospective consistent treatment across individuals, we should
appreciate the problem created.
Today, actual clinical decisions to end newborn human life that
take place behind closed doors in hospitals are rarely externally
scrutinized. Legally restrictive interpretations of the Best Interests
comes before the bench articulating a reasonable basis for believing that it would be better to proceed
with treatment, judges are almost always inclined to lend a sympathetic ear. Legal judgments, just like
medical judgments, are naturally predisposed to encourage life-preserving behaviors. This might help
explain, in part, why physicians in places like Texas have strongly supported legislation that offers
judicial bypasses in cases where providers believe further treatment to be futile. See, e.g., Robert L. Fine
et al., Medical Futility in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit: Hope for a Resolution, 116 PEDIATRICS
1219, 1222 (2005); Robert D. Truog, Tackling Medical Futility in Texas (author's reply), 357 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1558, 1559 (2007).
95. See McCullough, supra note 8, at 1021.
96. See, e.g., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Critical Care Decisions in Fetal and Neonatal
Medicine: Ethical Issues, Nov. 2006, at xvii, available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/
go/ourwork/neonatal/publication_406.html; see also Conunittee on Fetus and Newborn, Noninitiation or
Withdrawal of Intensive Carefor High-Risk Newborns, 119 PEDIATRICS 401,403 (2007).
97. See, e.g., D. Micah Hester, Interests and Neonates: There Is More to the Story Than We
Explicitly Acknowledge, 28 THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICs 357, 358-59 (2007).
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Standard in the context of such non-treatment decisions are rare
enough that they have failed to substantially change normative
professional practice. No neonatal physician can deny that we
occasionally make specific individual life-ending decisions without
all of the facts necessary to firmly predict whether a patient's future
life will be full of overwhelming pain and suffering. In particular,
early decisions to stop intensive care for extremely premature infants
who have suffered large intracranial hemorrhages or for newborns
who have suffered from some other form of serious brain injury
(asphyxia or congenital) are typically not based on concerns about
protracted pain and suffering as much as concern about a child's
predicted minimal future cognitive capacities. 98 Yet, even these
reasonable predictions about poor neurological outcome are no
substitute for their actual manifestation.
We can be and are very occasionally surprised when a child
survivor whose neurological prognosis was initially quite grim
appears to be adapting well to his or her permanent handicaps. We do
not have and may never have a reliable and comprehensive set of
forecasting tools, because static radiological imagery and lab markers
are incapable of telling us how a child may or may not adapt to her
future socially-constructed environment. At the beginning of life, it is
difficult to account for the potential plasticity of any given neuronal
circuitry, and even harder to account for the responses of any given
social community. So, if we are being brutally honest, we need to
admit that in some clinical cases when we retreat from newborn life
extension, it is too early to declare that life will not be "worth it" to
the child should she survive for decades with loving attention from
family and others. To admit this is not to say that our worry is
inauthentic at the moment of debating the value of providing life-
sustaining care.
Perhaps there really is no need to perturb the current pragmatic
equilibrium. Nevertheless, in these concluding remarks, I also offer
98. Stephen N. Wall & John Colin Partridge, Death in the Intensive Care Nursery: Physician
Practice of Withdrawing and Withholding Life Support, 99 PEDIATRICS 64, 66 (1997).
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that it is both na've and unrealistic to believe that important external
considerations do not influence providers and parents in making
treatment decisions for gravely ill newborns. Though robust
empirical evidence is lacking, I suspect many neonatologists consider
both the immediate and long-term negative impact a severely
disabled child might have on a family, and (less frequently) the
impact on society when recommending against the initiation or for
the discontinuation of treatment. 99 I also suspect many parents
instinctively worry about the immediate and long-term negative
impact a severely disabled child might have on their own relationship
and other siblings when they choose to avoid potentially life-saving
treatment, regardless of how physicians counsel them. 100 Some
qualitative data supports what is anecdotally a familiar observation in
neonatal and pediatric intensive care: some families are irreparably
traumatized with the introduction of a gravely disabled infant into
their lives. 101
It remains vexing to know whether and how to factor this real
psycho-social risk into our treatment decision-making calculus. On
the provocative interpretation of the President's Commission's
analysis offered in this essay, external costs (emotional, social,
financial) such as those that accrue to the family or society, are
deemed irrelevant because they do not specifically attend to the core
interests of the child. Some recent commentators also continue to tow
the professional party line charitably describing neonatal health care
providers as being "well-motivated" when their treatment decisions
are informed by "patient-oriented outcome variables" (futility,
viability, quality of life) rather than "societal or personal
concerns." 10 2 I question the sensibility of perpetuating such simplistic
99. Here, I speak as a practicing neonatologist who has had occasional conversations with colleagues
about such matters.
100. Here again, I speak as a practicing neonatologist who has had occasional conversations with
parents about such matters.
101. Dennis Drotar et al., The Impact of Extremely Low Birth Weight on the Families of School-Aged
Children, 117 PEDIATRICS 2006, 2010-11 (2006); Saroj Saigal et al., Impact of Extreme Prematurity on
Families ofAdolescent Children, 137 J. PED. 701, 705 (2000).
102. See Singh et al., supra note 34.
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dichotomies in defining when treatment decisions are ethical and
when they are not. First, as I hope this essay has demonstrated, I
doubt whether many in clinical medicine possess analytically sound
definitions of futility and viability. These terms are not only liable to
abuse, but they always entail value judgments. Second, I very much
worry about a dominant vantage of normalcy that creeps into
judgments about what constitutes an unacceptable quality of life for a
child. A life where one is only capable of enjoying the simplest of
primitive pleasures may still be of some value to the one in
possession of that life.
Finally, I am also increasingly persuaded that we need more
transparent discourse regarding when and why emotional, psycho-
social, and financial costs and burdens to persons other than
newborns can and ought to ethically matter in neonatal treatment
dilemmas. I do not believe that decisions to end life-support for
newborns can only be justified when we exclusively attend to so-
called patient-oriented outcome variables. Few of us, physicians and
patients included, are obstinate deontologists. That is, few of us are
really prepared to claim that no matter the cost to others, it is never
acceptable to sacrifice the possible benefit to one individual for the
sake of larger benefits. 10 3 We have a psychological tendency in
103. For example, imagine that we did institute a comprehensive policy of initiating and continuing
life-saving treatment for all newborns, infants, and children who had statistically small chances of
survival, and if successful, who might reasonably enjoy some aspects of extended life. Imagine that,
over time, this policy depleted the pool of financial and human health care resources because of the
intensity of services provided to this small group of patients. Imagine as a result of the shift in resource
allocation, routine coverage of many other highly valued health care services became unavailable for a
much larger segment of the pediatric population. Now, many more children suffer preventable health-
related harms that, while not lethal, are disabling (more than toothaches, less than appendicitis). Is it
obviously wrong in such a world to stop prioritizing the interests of this minority of life-threatened
children over the aggregate health interests of the others? The 2008 NICHD study estimated an extra
1,749 hospital days per zero to nine survivors per newborn treated between twenty-two and twenty-three
weeks. The cost for each hospital day was estimated at $3,400. The study concluded "that extending
intensive care to all of the most immature infants would entail considerable suffering, resource use, and
cost in order to benefit only a small proportion of infants." See generally Tyson et al., supra note 50, at
1678, 1680. Here, I only dispute the authors' claim regarding considerable suffering and I applaud the
admission of benefit to some survivors. It is not a given that any child survivor would have a life "worse
than death." Nevertheless, such a policy would extract a heavy toll in terms of resources and expenses,
and it is those costs that are capable of doing moral work.
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clinical medicine to frame ethical questions as either-or propositions.
However, there ought to be room for more nuanced analysis.
We might start with acknowledgement that when important values
are in genuine competition with each other, the prioritization of one
set necessarily entails the sacrifice of others. Strong intuitions are
relentlessly reinforced in the practice of clinical medicine and push us
to frame value trade-offs in ways that minimize our concern about
violating any individual patient's intrinsic moral worth. We feel
obligated as doctors to emphasize some significant cost or burden
imposed on our identified patients before we feel comfortable also
including more traditional utilitarian reasoning. At the clinical
bedside, the idea that we ought to trade away the life of a patient for
the sake of the overall material and social well-being of others must
be psychologically resisted.
Preposterous hypotheticals are not needed to make the case about a
place in clinical ethics for interpersonal consequentialist reasoning. In
a 2009 observational study of a high-quality academic intensive care
unit in India that faces severe constraints, hard decisions about which
neonates to invest scarce resources into are routinely made. 10
4
Perhaps not surprisingly, in a country where there exists essentially
no health insurance, patients pay for almost all care out-of-pocket,
and there exists no community safety net for families that are left to
care for seriously and permanently handicapped children, physicians
admitted that they heavily factored both familial and social variables
into specific treatment decisions.105
104. Ingrid Miljeteig, Sadath A. Sayeed, Amar Jesani, Kjell A. Johansson, & Ole F. Norheim, Impact
of Ethics and Economics on End-of-Life Decisions in an Indian Neonatal Unit, 124 PEDIATRICS e322-
28.
105. Id. at e324-25. ("Providers understood 'intact survival' to be absence of neurologic disability
and absence of a need for costly treatment in the future. They noted a duty to avoid pushing treatment on
a family when a neonate was likely to end up 'a compromised child.' Informants offered as partial
justification for their practice the reality that India possesses an inadequate system of supporting
children with disabilities, particularly with respect to rehabilitation, long-term treatment, and appropriate
educational services, and the reality that many families are poorly prepared to take on such burdens: 'As
there is no social security system for these premature and the commitment from the family is not there in
our society, we try to limit ourselves to the babies where it is likely to get better."').
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I do not conclude that the providers in India got the value trade-off
"right"; rather, I conclude that, under conditions of stress, there might
be a plurality of positions that can be rationally defended. We can
and should lament the lack of resources available in such places, and
advocate for more support from all possible corners, but there still
remains a problem of how to counsel the stakeholders on the ground
facing real clinical cases while they wait for the background
conditions to improve. It is not obvious to me that these Indian
physicians must demand parents bankrupt themselves and their
existing families in order to take home a seriously disabled child who
will likely be neglected and receive minimal support in an
impoverished community. It is not obvious to me that Indian
physicians facing these systemic constraints ought to assume
custodial care for these newborns if and when parents abandon them
in the hospital. For me, these are complex questions that do not lend
themselves to simple "yes" or "no" ethical answers. At a minimum,
they call attention to what remain poorly analyzed and understood
issues involving the social determinants of neonatal death and
survival and its social meaning.
To its credit, the President's Commission seemed keenly aware of
the broader implications of a normative policy that most often
encourages life extension for newborns at high risk of serious
disability:
Adoption and foster care should be available for parents unable
to raise their seriously handicapped child. To aid parents, support
that is responsive to the emotional and financial demands of
handicapped persons and their families should be available ....
Public support for effective voluntary organizations and
governmental programs is the inescapable extension of society's
deep interest in sustaining life in neonatal intensive care units. 6
106. Commission, supra note 9, at 228.
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After more than thirty years of providing neonatal intensive care, it
remains unclear that even in the United States we have met our
obligation to support either handicapped survivors or their
families. 10 7  Though the state has thankfully progressed beyond
providing "storage space and 'hay, oats, and water' for the worst-off
survivors of neonatal intensive care, it is also a stretch to claim that
we have done all that we should to make life manageable for families
who must endure after our initial medical success. 10 8  Rather
strikingly, the Commission also stated:
[T]o the extent that society fails to ensure that seriously ill
newborns have the opportunity for an adequate level of
continuing care, its moral authority to intervene on behalf of a
newborn whose life is in jeopardy is compromised.109
We need more open public reflection on what ought to follow from
such a compromise. Interestingly, health care economists have
mathematically modeled something like early newborn and infant
interests in the form of "acquired life potential."' 1 0 Implemented into
a cost-effectiveness analysis, it is an "age weight" that allows for the
systematic discounting of treatment interventions the earlier one
stands in the stream of temporal life. The notion of acquired life
potential follows from two controversial assumptions: 1) life acquires
value only as it acquires self-awareness, and 2) life acquires
107. The social availability of adoption and foster care cannot be denied in the United States. But
there can also be no denying a very peculiar sociological dynamic that seems called for if we suddenly
began to push strongly for this "option" on biological parents. Neonatal providers would be relieved of
taking into consideration the wishes of parents initially and instead would relay the facts regarding
predicted morbidity outcomes for at-risk newborns. Physicians would next introduce the idea that if
biological parents are not willing to play along with a treatment trial, they could opt out of the
presumptive decision maker role. Physicians would then need to assist parents in coming to terms with
formally transferring custody of their newborns to the state, at least temporarily. Even placing issues of
coercion and the promotion of a sense of parental abandonment aside, I cannot imagine such a
professional practice ever becoming routine.
108. Commission, supra note 9, at 228.
109. Commission, supra note 9, at 229.
110. Dean T. Jamison et al., Incorporating Deaths Near the Time of Birth into Estimates of the Global
Burden of Disease, in GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE AND RISK FACTORS 427, 438 (Alan D. Lopez et al.
ed., 2006).
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VALUING NEWBORN HUMAN LIFE
additional value as it develops bonds with others. The intuition
behind these assumptions is arguably not so radical: many accept the
claim that the death of a newborn is not as great a loss either to the
newborn or to the rest of us as is the death of an older child, teenager
or adult."'11
If this intuition reflects something deeper than superficial
sentiment, it calls for a fuller accounting not only by philosophers
and economists, but also by those who claim to have a stake in
medical treatment decisions for seriously sick newborns. As
dangerous as it may be, I believe this kind of intuition partly explains
why conscientious doctors in India behave the way they do under
what must be disheartening conditions. The notion that newborns are
not full moral beings as compared to more developed persons might
be understood as a way to preserve our deontological leanings. It
shies away from regarding cognitively naive human beings in purely
instrumental terms. To borrow from philosophical tradition, we are
no longer comparing apples to apples but acorns to trees, and it thus
becomes easier to justify according them different amounts of
respect. In the end, it may also help explain why, in places like the
United States, we seem sociologically capable of allowing two
clinical norms to co-exist in tension: we stand ready on a moment's
notice to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars to save the life of
one critically ill newborn (an acorn is still worth something), while
simultaneously, we stand ready to avoid such investment even when
there are not unreasonable grounds to believe that a newborn could
go on to value her own life just as much as the rest of us are capable
of doing (but an acorn is not worth everything).
111. The natural intuition plays out further-death at an elderly age does not seem so great a loss as
deaths at younger ages. An extended discussion of this intuition, its relation to the abortion question, and
the problem of neonatal interests and defining moral personhood is beyond the scope of this paper and
its author. See generally John Harris, The Concept of the Person and the Value of Life, KENNEDY INST.
OF ETHICS J. 293, 293-94 (1999); see also generally JEFF McMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING:
PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
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